事故简报

孟加拉国拆船基地发

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环境保护

Clarksons称2016年

内容摘要:2016年可谓是全球拆船市场最为繁忙的一年,尤其是集装箱船和散货船等船型,拆解率持续走高,给航运业带来了一丝复苏的生机,但粗糙的拆解活动也给环境和安全带来了一些问题

海事新技术

三井获得Crowley Co

内容摘要:三井获得Crowley ConRo的柴油机订单:三井造船(MES)获得电控气喷射式柴油机的首批订单。该机型是根据二冲程低速柴油机原理所制造的高效狄塞尔循环双燃料柴油机,可根据对燃料价格、可得性和环保的考虑,选择适用重油或者天然气。


三井造船(MES)获得电控气喷射式柴油机(以下简称ME-GI)的首批订单。


MAN B

航运综合

因拖欠债务一油轮在

一艘迪拜港湾航海公司的大型油轮由于公司拖欠贷款,在鹿特丹港口被扣押。这艘油轮在鹿特丹港正在销售货物时,被按照其不满的债主的指令强行抛锚。


港湾航海公司声明说他们正在和贷款方协商释放油轮。该船起先是在鹿特丹港的码头区抛锚,后来从卸货区开始移动,接着就收到逮捕通知了。


 鹿特丹港当局确认说这艘大型油轮仍在港口区抛锚。发言人说这艘油轮已经不在被扣押的港口了

独家报道
独家报道

马绍尔群岛共和国:扩展平台故障造成船员死亡

来源: 2019-10-22 14:34:14 责任编辑:国际海员服务中心网 人气:

马绍尔群岛共和国(RMI)海事局于2018年11月发布了一份关于“佩内洛普”号散货船在珊瑚海航行时沉没的调查报告。一名海员站在扩展平台上,等待船上的一台补给起重机脱离并从8-9米的高空坠落。这名海员系着安全带,安全带的延长部分有一根与扶手相连的绳子。

 
事故情况
 
2018年11月26日,悬挂马绍尔群岛旗帜的佩内洛普号在珊瑚海进行压舱航行,从大韩民国的丽水市到澳大利亚的纽卡斯尔市。
 
16时许,一名值班水手(ASD)和一名船员(OS)在左舷补给起重机上进行例行维修。
 
OS站在靠近辅助ASD的左舷起重机的驾驶台甲板上。ASD站在站台分机上。
 
两人都穿着工作服、手套、安全靴和安全帽。ASD还系着一条安全带,安全带上的一条线连接到延长段的扶手上。
 
大约世界时1655时,平台延伸部分分离并掉落到左舷救生艇甲板上。扩展平台在救生艇甲板上方约8-9m,然后坠落。
 
当滑动门分离时,它正站在扩展平台上。他的安全绳系在平台延伸部分的栏杆上,导致滑动门连同平台一起坠落到救生艇甲板约8-9米处。
 
当扩展平台和ASD坠落时,OS正在拉取一些额外的帆布,他的视野从起重机上移到了别处。他没有看到发生了什么事,但报告说他听到一声巨响。
 
他因坠落砸伤而死。
 
结论
 
以下结论是基于上述事实和分析结果得出的,决不构成责任推定或责任分摊:
 
1,造成这一非常严重的海上事故的原因包括:
 
舷侧供给起重机下部两部分的连接设计本来就很薄弱,容易发生故障。它基于三个短焊接支架,不包括连接下层两部分栏杆的机械连接;用于连接下层两部分的支架的焊缝失效;ASD的安全线与下一级平台延伸部分的栏杆相连。
 
2,可能造成这一非常严重的海上事故的其他原因包括:
 
在最近一次由船员或验船师进行的检查中,没有发现每个落在主平台上的托架腐蚀情况;
 
用于将平台延伸段固定至主平台的支架连接件发生故障的潜在后果可能尚未得到承认;
 
公司PMS中的检查清单可能没有那么有效,因为它不包括检查上下阶段的要求;以及
缺乏国际和国家对提升装置安全通道的设计、维护和检查的要求。
 
采取的行动
 
公司采取了以下预防措施:
 
修改了主平台和平台延伸部分之间的连接设计,以包括船舶左舷和右舷供应起重机栏杆处的机械连接;
 
修改公司PMS中的起重机检查清单,包括检查上下维护平台的状况;
 
修订了公司高空或侧边作业的许可证和风险评估,包括评估可能连接安全线以避免额外危险的位置的指南;
 
为公司船队的所有船舶提供五个全身安全带和防坠落系统;以及
修订了SMS,将“停工”程序作为采用基于行为的安全系统的一部分。
 
船组已经采取或正在采取下列行动:
 
2019年7月发布了一份内部通知,提请其测量员在对起重机进行测量时注意这一特殊的安全风险;以及
考虑对英属维尔京群岛规则注释526第4章第2节第2.1.3段进行修订,以包括提及用于检查起重设备的梯子、舷梯或其他通道的连接。
 
管理团队已采取以下操作:
 
2019年7月30日发布了23-19号海上安全公告,其中包括根据对港口供应起重机下部两部分连接故障的海上安全调查,为船舶管理人员提出的建议措施。
 
建议
 
基于上述调查结果,马绍尔群岛共和国提出以下建议:
 
1,不向公司或船组提出任何建议。
 
2,建议起重机制造商考虑:
 
开发一种方法,用图纸上所示的连接细节加强起重机上的连接,以提供安装在佩内洛普号上的起重机,并向安装这些起重机的船舶的船东发布维修公告;以及
修改新起重机的设计细节,该起重机采用了与下一级两段相似的连接方式。
 
建议管理团队在海事组织审议关于制定船上起重设备和用具的《国际海上人命安全公约》修正案的提案时,考虑到上述结论。
 
 image004.jpg
 
RMI: Crew fatality from failure of extension platform
 
The Republic of Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator issued an investigation report on a fatal fall onboard the bulk carrier 'Penelope' while underway in the Coral Sea in November 2018. A seafarer was standing on the extension platform for one of the ship’s provision cranes which detached and fell 8-9 meters. The seafarer was wearing a safety belt with a line connected to the handrail on the extension.
 
CASUALTIES | 21/10/19
 
The incident
 
On 26 November 2018, the Marshall Islands-flagged Penelope was underway in the Coral Sea on a ballast voyage from Yeosu, Republic of Korea to Newcastle, Australia.
 
At about 16:00 hrs, an Able Seafarer Deck (ASD) and an Ordinary Seafarer (OS) were performing routine maintenance on the port side provision crane.
 
The OS was standing on the Bridge Deck near the port side crane assisting the ASD. The ASD was standing on the platform extension.
 
Both were wearing coveralls, gloves, safety boots, and safety helmets. The ASD was also wearing a safety belt with a line connected to the handrail on the extension.
 
At approximately 1655, the platform extension detached and fell to the port side Lifeboat Deck. The platform extension was approximately 8-9 m above the Lifeboat Deck before falling.
 
The ASD was standing on the platform extension when it detached. His safety line was attached to the railing on the platform extension, which caused the ASD to fall together with the platform about 8-9 meters to the Lifeboat Deck.
 
When the platform extension and the ASD fell, the OS was getting some extra rags and was looking away from the crane. He did not see what happened but reported hearing a loud noise.
 
He died as a result of injuries sustained from the fall.
 
Conclusions
 
The following Conclusions are based on the above Findings of Fact and Analysis and shall in no way create a presumption of blame or apportion liability:
 
1. Causal factors that contributed to this very serious marine casualty include:
 
the design of the connection of the two parts of the lower stage of the portside provision crane was inherently weak and prone to failure. It was based on three short welded brackets and it did not include mechanical connections joining the railing on the two parts of the lower stage;
the failure of the welds for the brackets used to connect the two parts of the lower stage; and
the ASD’s safety line was connected to the railing on the platform extension of the lower stage.
 
2. Causal factors that may have additionally contributed to this very serious marine casualty include:
 
corrosion where each bracket landed on the main platform not being detected during the most recent inspections conducted by members of the ship’s crew or by class surveyor;
the potential consequences of a failure of the bracketed connections used to secure the platform extension to the main platform might not have been recognized;
the inspection checklist in the Company’s PMS may not have been as effective as it could have been because it did not include a requirement to inspect the upper and lower stages; and
the lack of international and national requirements addressing the design, maintenance, and inspection of means of safe access to lifting devices.
 
Actions taken
 
The Company has taken the following preventive actions:
 
modified the design of the connection between the main platform and the platform extension to include mechanical connections at the railings on the ship’s port and starboard provision cranes;
amended the crane inspection checklist in the company’s PMS to include inspection of the condition of the upper and lower maintenance platforms;
amended the Company’s permit and risk assessment for working aloft or over the side21 to include guidance for assessing locations where a safety line might be attached to avoid additional hazards;
provided all ships in the company’s fleet with five full body safety harnesses and fall arrest systems; and
amended the SMS to include a “Stop Work” procedure as part of its adoption of a Behavior-Based Safety System.
 
The class has taken or is taking the following actions:
 
issued an internal circular in July 2019 drawing its surveyors’ attention to this specific risk for their safety when they carry out survey of cranes; and
considering an amendment to BV Rule Note NR 526, Chapter 4, Section 2, paragraph 2.1.3 to include a reference to the connections of ladders, gangways or other means of access used for the inspection to lifting appliances.
 
The Administrator has taken the following action:
 
issued Marine Safety Advisory 23–19 on 30 July 2019 that included recommended actions for ship managers based on the marine safety investigation of the failure of the connection of the two parts of the lower stage of the port provision crane.
 
Recommendations
 
Based on the above findings, RMI made the following recommendations:
 
1.No recommendations are made to the company or the class.
 
2. It is recommended that the crane manufacturer consider:
 
developing a means of reinforcing the connection on cranes built using the connection details shown on the drawings for the provision cranes fitted onboard PENELOPE and issuing a service bulletin to owners of ships fitted with those cranes; and
amending the design details for new cranes that use a similar means of connection of the two sections of the lower stage.
 
It is recommended that the Administrator take the above conclusions into account when considering proposals at the IMO related to the development of amendments to SOLAS for shipboard lifting gear and appliances.
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